Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the

panel, too. I would also like to thank the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee staff, because we meet periodically, and I must say that

you have a lot of Afghan experts on your staff, on both sides of the aisle.

There is an old American saying that posits, ‘‘The biggest enemy

of better is best,’’ and that applies to Afghanistan. If you go for the

best, as you, Senator, and others were commenting, you are not

going to get there. All we can hope for is steady, incremental improvement,

given the horrendous situation after 25 years of war,

and the many problems, economic, security, et cetera, that rock that country.

The loya jirga was, in my opinion, a success overall. There were

setbacks, there were complaints, and you can read about them in

the New York Times op eds; however, again, ‘‘the biggest enemy of

better is best.’’ Hamid Karzai was selected by secret ballot, which

he insisted on, by a great majority of the delegates. The cabinet

that he has represents diversity, the different ethnic groups, broadly

speaking, in the country. Actually, probably not even the Almighty

could satisfy all Afghan groups that they are fairly represented.

But I think there is a broad representation of all ethnic

and religious groups in his cabinet. I think he has done very well.

The three Vice Presidents represent the main ethnic groups in the

country, Pushtun, Hazara, and Tajik.

The challenges of reconstruction now are before us. I wrote a

May 17 editorial published in the Wall Street Journal on some

problems in the reconstruction process. Hamid Karzai gave a VOA

interview yesterday, in which he says, ‘‘Foreign aid continues to be

a trickle, and now that the loya jirga is finished, we have to deliver.

Our honeymoon is over,’’ is what he told VOA.

There has been a lot of talk about $4.5 billion going out there,

but, in fact, as I mentioned in that Wall Street Journal editorial,

a lot of it is captured and snarled in aid bureaucracies, the United

Nations, our own, British. It is not getting down to the lowest level.

In fact, the only reconstruction activity that we have seen has been

the Special Forces civil action teams out in the villages, building

wells, schools, roads. The money that is for reconstruction, that has

been promised and appropriated, is not there. The traction is not

there. Something has to be done.

The four strategic reconstruction goals are mentioned, I will not

go into them in my statement, which I would point to. The most

important by far is the revival and modernization of Afghan na-

tional self-governing institutions, democratic, economic, administrative,

and military. There was a lot of—sort of skeptical comments

on Afghan’s ability to govern themselves in this session, but I

would underline that from 1933 to the Soviet invasion there was

stability in Afghanistan, there was progress along the democratic

path. Unlike South Korea, Taiwan, this did not come because of

sustained American pressure. It came from an Afghan elite in

Kabul, including the former king, Zahir Shah, who introduced a

democratic constitution in 1964, and then implemented that democratic

constitution, including two parliamentary elections, which

were held in 1965 and 1969.

It was outside interference by the Soviet Union, primarily the

KGB operating through Communist parties inside Afghanistan,

who were situated in the military as well as the civilian side, that

overthrew this democratic process; but these institutions were

building in the 1960s and early 1970s. Well, we should go back to

them. Hamid Karzai’s father was Speaker of the Parliament during that period.

Success or failure of the massive historic reconstruction process

in Afghanistan will depend mainly on implementation of this first

strategic goal. Revival of Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself when

foreign aid tapers off in 5, 7, or 10 years’ time.

Nation building, a la Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, is not necessary

in Afghanistan. They were never nations. Afghanistan has

been a nation for 300 years. It was never colonized. In the 20th

century, it sprouted its own self-governing institutions. In my opinion,

the centerpiece of the international community’s reconstruction

efforts should, therefore, be to aid and facilitate the reestablishment

of Afghanistan’s governing institutions, equipping them to operate

in today’s 21st century environment. The U.S.-led coalition

and the current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this

endeavor. The stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out and

render Afghan institutions effective is key. Failure would lead to

renewed fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted foreign

investment, and the resumed exploitation of Afghan territory by terrorists.

Only an Afghan government, standing once again on its own two

feet, can keep the peace internally and resume a constructive role

in the international community. In this connection, I urge positive

consideration by the Senate for the Henry Hyde House bill, the

Freedom Support Act, which is modeled on the Freedom Support

Act for Newly Independent States, passed in the early 1990s by

Congress. You took the initiative; you should take it again. It is

going to establish, if it is approved, a separate budget, like the

Freedom Support Act budget.

It will have a separate budget for Afghanistan. It will not be, as

has been the case so far, taking money incrementally from different

pots around the Federal Government, but establish structurally a

budget, establish the position of coordinator, which Rich Armitage

first held in the early 1990s for the NIS Freedom Support Act

budget, and is now ably carried out by Bill Taylor, Ambassador

Taylor, in the State Department, a coordinator to bring together all

of the different agencies in the U.S. Government in a coordinated

way, who are involved in Afghanistan, and I believe there are over 20 today.

Let me just end by commenting that I support the expansion of

ISAF to regions inside Afghanistan, particularly Mazar-e-Sharif,

Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. I would underscore what you

said, Mr. Chairman, if you look at that area of Mazar-e-Sharif, the

Tajik commander, Atef Mohammed, and Dostam are at each other’s

throats. Mohakek is a Hazara warlord; he is also involved. They

have all agreed that they support the deployment of an ISAF contingent,

and it only has to be a couple hundred to Mazar-e-Sharif.

That would definitely assist stability and security in the area,

and reconstruction in the area; otherwise, without this foreign sort

of referee presence, until the central government is able to establish

the military with a reach across the country and security from

the center, the fighting in the region is going to continue, the attacks

on refugees and also on women are going to continue, and

that applies, to a lesser extent, to Kandahar and Jalalabad.

It would not take much, you are not going to be deploying thousands

to these different urban centers of Afghanistan. You are

going to be deploying tens or hundreds, but it would accomplish a

great deal in bringing security to these areas. Thank you, sir.

I will try to. I want to repeat what you said,

though, echo what you just said there, that we have to give the utmost

praise to our military for what they have done in Afghanistan,

and this brilliant victory, and what they are doing now. I

mentioned the civil action groups that are right now out in the villages

and towns, the only ones really in the whole international aid

establishment community that I have seen doing work at the village

level, with villages, in a practical domain.

Yes. It is also unfortunate that—that is why I think

this Henry Hyde Freedom Support Act initiative is so incredibly

important. It will give a framework to a Marshall Plan-type initiative

for Afghanistan. It gives it focus, it gives it a budget, and it

gives it a coordinative mechanism inside the U.S. Government, like

Rich used to do, and Bill Taylor does today, to make sure that

those countries, 12 of the countries, which came out of the former

Soviet Union are getting assistance in a coordinated way from our government.

I was asked to appear on Christiane Amanpour’s CNN show a

number of times, and one time she asked me, this was in November,

‘‘Why is CENTCOM, including General Franks, opposing the

deployment of ISAF to Kabul.’’ This was not to the other urban

areas. It was to Kabul.

I said, I think it is a mistake. You have just heard in the testimony

division between, we have to go after the bad guys, which we

do, al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and on the other

hand, on this other track, we have to assist Afghanistan to come

back to the track of a normal country.

The fact of the matter is that there is a thick linkage between

these two, and you are only going to succeed in the first area if you

have a functioning government, with military security, economic,

political arms that work, which has the support of the people, and

that is the Bonn track, and it is working. The loya jirga worked.

They are going to have elections. Again, they are going to have parliamentary

elections in 2004. That is the long-term answer, that is

the moral domain, as my colleague stated here in his testimony.

But I think what we are seeing, what the hangup is, it is from—

within the Pentagon, there is this feeling that expanding ISAF is

going to interfere with going after Taliban and al-Qaeda. I think

that is mistaken, and also there is a problem, and I think the Pentagon

has a point here, that we have to get support of our allies

to do this. But you are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman, unless the

United States shows leadership, there is no chance we are going to

get support of our allies.

We can do it, if we show leadership, and we should have done

it, in my opinion, 2 months ago. Indeed, the three commanders

squabbling among themselves around Mazar-e-Sharif, causing so

much friction up there, they have requested ISAF deployment to

their region, because they know that they cannot continue.

As the attacks were going on in November and December, some

French and Jordanian contingents were deployed up there, working

with these various groups, and their fighting stopped. Then the

French and Jordanians left, and now the friction has resumed. So

I just end up where I began. I think in answer to your question

that the problem is coming from our uniformed services, who have

performed so brilliantly and are still performing so brilliantly, I

just think here it is political, and I am afraid that they are able

to carry the day inside the Pentagon.

Could I comment just briefly?

I think the President himself has come out forcibly

in underscoring that we are going to stay, for a Marshall Plan. We

are in there for the long haul. What you are getting at, I think, and

what I was trying to get at is this misconception that there is an

internal contradiction between going after al-Qaeda and the

Taliban on the one hand, and helping the government develop the

institutions that it needs to in helping the country move back onto

a free market democracy track, which it was on in the 1960s and

early 1970s, that there is a contradiction here. And the answer to

this is, there is not a contradiction, and that is what I mentioned

on the Christiane Amanpour show, that one supports the other,

and ultimately if you have a central government that is functioning

with democratic institutions, it is going to help in the task of going

after al-Qaeda and the Taliban. There is a misunderstanding of this.

To answer the first part of your question, my testimony

has three elements that are there in the Freedom Support

Act. One is what you were getting at earlier in the hearing, a strategy,

a reconstruction strategy, which is missing, an umbrella, and

from democracy, to women’s rights, to infrastructure, to education,

you want to see a structure and a strategy, and if you look at the

material that has come with this Henry Hyde bill, it describes that

strategy objective.

Second, it is a separate budget. You will have a press conference

in the administration, and somebody wants to say something nice,

it is going to be on Afghanistan, so it is announced that $100 million

has been allocated for refugee assistance, but it has already

been allocated; or say, $10 million is taken from another pot of

money in the administration for announcement of this press conference.

There is not the overall coherence you need which would

come with something like the Freedom Support Act. Most important,

and I noticed this when I was the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia

for 3 years, the presence of this coordinator mechanism in the

State Department, not in one of the elements of the aid community,

but right there in the State Department, the last stop before the

budget goes to the Hill, the final budget, was of an advantage to

ambassadors, because we could talk to our staff, and I had 12 agencies

at post, and put together an integrated plan, and then send

it to this coordinator mechanism, Ambassador Taylor now, and

then the budget would go up to the Hill.

So in the field, we were coordinated, and in Washington there

was coordination, because USAID and USIA, and other elements of

the aid community, had to be coordinated by this coordinator. So

you need that for Afghanistan, since so many agencies and departments

now are involved in Afghanistan.

Congress took the lead on the Freedom Support Act. It did not

come out of the administration. You guys said, ‘‘Hey, there is a

problem here,’’ and you resolved it, and you did. So I would argue

that you should do it again.

Could I have 20 seconds to followup on this?

Thank you. More than 20 seconds?

Thank you. The Afghans want the United States to

be intrusive; they do not want thousands and thousands, say

10,000-20,000 U.S. troops with fire support, and bases like in Vietnam.

I think General Franks and CENTCOM have, again, have

just performed brilliantly in keeping us at the 7,000 or below level,

but they want America there symbolically, and in substance.

And it does not matter how many Americans are there in an aid

capacity, or, say, nonmilitary capacity. They see us as having given

them the wherewithal to defeat the Soviets, which we did. They defeated

the Soviets. They saw us as helping them throw off the yoke

of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which our military did. So we have

a very good image and reputation in Afghanistan. We should not

worry too much about intrusiveness, if we stay away from deploying

tens of thousands of troops there, as the general and others have mentioned.

Thank you, and thanks for all your help, Senator,

at UNO, University of Nebraska, and our Center for Afghanistan Studies, too.

I want to answer the general question about what influence this

is having internationally and regionally, what we are doing in Afghanistan.

I would give a positive and a negative side to that. On

the positive side, if we succeed in Afghanistan, we will be creating

a model of an American-led international operation, helping a Muslim

population to throw off extremism, Muslim extremism, and returning

to the road of democracy, and economic development, and moderate Islam.

So Afghanistan could be a model for the Muslim world, and

internationally, a country that was sunk into the abyss of radical

extremism, al-Queda, and the Taliban, but its population did not

want it. Its population was moderate Islam, and we helped them

get back on the track, and prosper. So that would have a ripple effect, I think.

One of the reasons why the Iranian clerics—I would not say the

Foreign Minister or the President of Iran, I would say the Iranian

clerics—are interfering against Hamid Karzai, because they are

worried that this model might succeed.

Also, if Afghanistan, given its location, can get back on the right

track, it will be a crossroads for global corridors of trade, and commerce,

and telecommunication connecting Europe, and China, and

Russia, and South Asia.

On the resources, doing it right, if you want to build a well, for

example, or reconstruct a school, or road as our Special Forces are

doing, it only cost $200 or $5,000. Not much, but we have to do it

right, and we will not be spending that much at the local level. Unfortunately,

the way the aid bureaucracies are organized, internationally

and in our own country, is that 80 percent of the money

gets sopped up by salaries for expatriates, the Americans, or U.N.

types, as the case may be, trips to the region, and in the end, there

is not much action on the ground, in terms of actual projects. The

Armenian Prime Minister used to complain to me all the time

about international aid projects in his country.

I guess I have run out of time, so I will stop there.

General GRANGE. I think that actually goes back to all the questions

that have been brought up, and that is, I believe our concern

is three major things. One that I will just disregard right away is:

I do not think we are hung up on this aversion to have casualties

like we used to be. I do not think that is really the big issue now,

but I think these are the issues of maybe the hesitant nature of

what is going on.

One is that getting in a fight with others, as you expand out of

Kabul with a security force, no one wants to get into a fight with

others while we are still fighting the Taliban and the al-Queda. I

think that is a concern.

No. 2 is that the commitment, as this broad front with the war

on terrorists, it is a broad front. It is a global commitment. And I

believe, when I left the military at the end of 1999, we worked

pretty hard, and we did not have the war on terrorism yet. The division

I commanded, when we went those 2 years—and some of you

visited our units. We were all over the map. And it is hard to say

what mission could be eliminated, and what you continue on with.

But it was quite a lot of commitment, not only in time, but people,

and, of course, resources, ammunition, equipment, et cetera. So

there is a concern on commitment with more in Afghanistan. I

think those are the two main issues of concern.

To solve that, one is that, in my mind, I would think Afghanistan

was the main effort. We are not fighting Iraq right now. I mean

we may be gathering intelligence and that in other places around

the world, and we have other things, the Republic of Georgia,

Yemen, Philippines, Colombia, et cetera, but the main effort in my

mind, I would think, would be Afghanistan. And if that is your

main effort, that is what you resource to accomplish the mission.

And I agree with what the ambassador said, if that is successful,

I believe through the optics of others in that region with different

cultures, that some of the other people we have problems with will

fall in line, because it will be a model, it will be a success story,

and success stories, people want to emulate.

So I really think there is something there, and if we win that,

it will have a great effect on what we are trying to do globally.

Thank you.